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TORTS-GUEST ACT-NEGLIGENT CONDUCT OF THE DRIVER-Plaintiff was
a gratuitous passenger in an automobile driven by defendant. Defendant,
intending to coast to his destination, turned off the ignition, removed the
key, and placed it in his pocket. The removal of the key caused the steering gear to lock, and defendant was unable to avoid a collision with a
tree. Plaintiff suffered injuries and brought suit. Evidence was adduced
to show that in defendant's type of automobile the steering wheel was so
constructed as to lock upon removal of the key. Testimony revealed that
defendant understood the general operation of the lock, but that the particular mechanism on his car had never worked previously. Even though
the Indiana guest act bars recovery for injuries to a guest unless caused by
"willful or wanton misconduct" of the driver, the trial court found defendant liable. On appeal, held, reversed. The case was not a question for the
jury. Wanton or reckless conduct, within the meaning of the Indiana
guest act, means a conscious persistence in negligent conduct in the face of
a known danger. Sausaman v. Leininger, (Ind. App. 1956) 137 N.E. (2d)
547.
Guest acts similar to that of Indiana are in effect in twenty-six states.1
Their provisions immunize a negligent driver from liability for injury
to gratuitous passengers riding in the defendant's automobile unless the
injury has been caused by misconduct variously described as willful, 2
wanton,3 grossly negligent,4 reckless,5 or heedless.6 For the past thirty
years judges have struggled to translate these epithets into a simple, useful
statement of a standard of duty owing from the motorist to the passengera standard which would enable the courts to determine under what circumstances a case should be submitted to the jury and, on the other hand,
when it should be taken from the jury and decided, in favor of the defendant, as a matter of law. A notable harmony among the state courts both
as to approach and outcome has resulted, despite the variety of descrip1 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
A twenty-seventh, Washington, has passed a statute which bars all recovery unless the
injury is the result of the driver's "intentional" misconduct.
2 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
a Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas,
Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming.
4 Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
IS Idaho, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas.
6 New Mexico, South Carolina, and Texas.
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tions of culpable negligence.7 The minimum duty is the following: after
the host-motorist has actually discovered that there is danger in the manner
in which his automobile is being driven, he must use reasonable care to
get out of that position of danger. Put another way, a passenger must
establish two facts before the judge will decide that the case should go to
the jury: first, that defendant actually knew of a particular dangerous
situation; and second, that defendant, in view of the emergency circumstances, did not exercise reasonable and prudent efforts to extricate his
guest from the danger.s Evidence that the defendant had an actual
knowledge of the peril may be shown by the fact that defendant actually
observed the danger,9 or that he was given warning of it by his guests,10
or by road signs,11 or by familiarity with the roadway12 or vehicle.13 The
experience of a driver is a factor in establishing his knowledge of the
danger. Inexperienced drivers, unused to the treachery of deep gravel or

·1vermont and Virginia, in the construction of their guest acts, have adopted a more
liberal rule for the guest than have the other states. Their "humanitarian" interpretation
grants recovery for conduct not much removed from ordinary negligence. See Chamberlain v. Delphia, 118 Vt. 193, 103 A. (2d) 94 (1954) and Masters v. Cardi, 186 Va. 261, 42
S.E. (2d) 203 (1947).
s See Russell v. Turner, (N.D. Iowa 1944) 56 F. Supp. 455 (applying Iowa law), affd.
(8th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 562. See also Willett v. Smith, 260 Mich. 101, 244 N.W. 246
(1932): Hottel v. Read, 66 Ohio App. 323, 33 N.E. (2d) 1011 (1940).
9 A jury question: Blinn v. Hatton, 112 Mont. 219, 114 P. (2d) 518 (1941) (defendant
tried to pass a weaving truck on a narrow road and was side-swiped); Froh v. Hein, 76
N.D. 701, 39 N.W. (2d) 11 (1949) (defendant though enveloped in a dust cloud raised by
preceding cars, did not slacken speed, struck an unlit car hidden by the dust); Jones v.
Harris, 104 Cal. App. (2d) 347, 231 P. (2d) 561 (1951) (defendant struck car which he saw
was in the oncoming car lane). A question not submissible to the jury: Schneider v. Parish,
242 Iowa 1147, 49 N.W. (2d) 535 (1951) (motorcyclist and his passenger could not see a
road fork nor the truck driver's signal that he was turning into the fork, tried to pass
the truck, and were side-swiped).
10 A jury question: Crowell v. Demo, 231 Iowa 228, 1 N.W. (2d) 93 (1941) (guest
warned driver of an obstacle in the road); Scott v. Shairrick, 225 Ark. 59, 279 S.W. (2d)
39 (1955) (protestation about defendant's inability to control car at speed he was driving).
A question not submissible to the jury: Goetsch v. Matheson, 246 Iowa 800, 68 N.W. (2d)
77 (1955); Gunderson v. Sopiwnik, 75 S.D. 402, 66 N.W. (2d) 510 (1954) (guests uttered no
protest at the driver's conduct prior to the accident).
11 A jury question: Jenkins v. Sharp, 140 Ohio St. 80, 42 N.E. (2d) 755 (1942) (defendant attempted to shoot a stop sign); Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo. 25,252 P. (2d) 1067 (1953)
(defendant attempted to pass even though he saw a sign which said "Do Not Pass"). A
question not submissible to the jury: Born v. Matzner's Estate, 159 Neb. 169, 65 N.W. (2d)
593 (1954) (defendant did not see stop sign); Goodman v. Gonse, (Iowa 1956) 76 N.W.
(2d) 873 (there was no curve sign on a deceptively sharp curve).
12 A jury question: Nangle v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 96 Mont. 512, 32 P. (2d) 11 (1934)
(defendant failed to negotiate familiar railway crossing). A question not submissible to the
jury: Russell v. Turner, note 8 supra (defendant did not know road came to a dead end).
13 A jury question: Bowman v. p·uckett, 144 Tex. 125, 188 S.W. (2d) 571 (1945) (driver
knew brakes were defective). A question not submissible to the jury: In re Smoke's Estate,
157 Neb. 152, 59 N.W. (2d) 184 (1953) (driver did not know of defect in the steering
wheel).
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ice, for example, will be relieved of liability,14 while an experienced
motorist, under similar conditions, will be culpable.1 5 Any situation where
injury is probable constitutes a danger.16 Driving in excess of the speed
limit is not a danger, unless it is at such an extreme speed,17 or under
such conditions,18 that the driver has but partial control of the vehicle.
The degree of care required to avoid the danger varies directly with the
time interval between the moment of knowledge of the danger and the
accident. If the driver never was aware of the danger until the accident, no
effort at all is required.19 Where the accident is inevitable when the defendant apprehends his peril, the presence or absence of effort, be it completely
ineffectual and futile, may well be the difference between a driver's innocence or guilt. 20 Timely knowledge of danger and persistence in spite
of it is the aggravated kind of conduct which falls below the standard of
duty required of a motorist. 21 In the principal case, the Indiana court
applied this standard. Its analysis turned on whether the defendant understood the danger of his particular steering mechanism locking, and it concluded that he was unaware that the previously defective lock would now
work. Since he was without this actual knowledge, as a matter of law
his conduct violated no duty to the plaintiff. In effect the courts have
immunized what might be called unwitting negligence on the part of the
driver. By inquiring into three particular facts- (1) defendant's subjective
knowledge, (2) presence of danger, and (3) defendant's due care after
apprehension of the danger-the courts have permitted liability to be
affixed where the legislature would have it placed-upon the host with the
"I-don't-care-what-happens" attitude.22 It also provides the passenger with

14 Chemotik v. Schrank, (S.D. 1956) 79 N.W. (2d) 4 (young defendant lost control of
car when he braked on gravel); Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P. (2d) 1038 (1954)
(defendant lost control when his car slid on ice).
15 Mel.one v. Bean, 263 Mich. 113, 248 N.W. 566 (1933) (defendant lost control of his
car on a gravel road).
16 See Russell v. Turner, note 8 supra.
17 See Fritz v. Wohler, (Iowa 1956) 78 N.W. (2d) 27 (1956) (court said, in dicta, that
up to 90 m.p.h was insufficient in itself to be a violation of a driver's duty to his guest).
18 Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, IO S. (2d) 715 (1942) (driving at extreme speed with
smooth tires on a wet pavement was a violation of the driver's duty to his guest).
19 Burrell v. Anderson, 133 Colo. 386, 295 P. (2d) 1039 (1956) (attention of driver
distracted while he sought to adjust radio). Contra, Chamberlain v. Delphia, note 7 supra
(defendant was lighting a cigarette and did not see oncoming car that was partially in
defendant's lane. Jury verdict of grossly negligent conduct was affirmed).
20A jury question: Koroma v. Kreifels, 144 Neb. 745, 14 N.W. (2d) 591 (1944) (driver
did not apply his brakes after losing control). A question not submissible to the jury:
Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461, 253 P. (2d) 240 (1953); Cunning v. Knott, 157 Neb. 170,
59 N.W. (2d) 180 (1953) (defendant applied brakes in vain for 120 feet before hitting
embankment at dead end of country road).
21 Even though a breach of duty is established, it must be proved that the breach
caused the accident. Splawn v. Wright, 198 Ark. 197, 128 S.W. (2d) 248 (1939) (danger was
the likelihood of skidding on the slick pavement; accident was caused by the inattention
of the driver who did not see the bridge abutment in time to apply the brakes).
22 See McHugh v. Brown, (Del. 1956) 125 A. (2d) 583 at 586.
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a modicum of control, for, whether or not the passenger has given timely
warning of a specific danger may well detern).ine whether or not he will
recover. 23 This standard is not without its difficulties. Ascertainment of
what a man knows, difficult at best, is a hopeless job if both driver and
passenger have been killed in the accident.24 Also, since the test involves subjective knowledge, it may make liable the cautious, less negligent driver who is more perceptive to the dangers inherent in a situation,
while the inattentive, even reckless, driver who never sees the trouble until
the accident is inevitable may not be liable. 2 5 So long as some states
choose to limit a driver's liability to his passengers, however, to draw the
line between unwitting and knowing negligence is to arrive at a predictable
and generally not unsatisfactory result.

William K. Muir, Jr.

23 See

note 10 supra.
Contrast the different presumptions raised in two cases where the question of culpable
negligence was submitted to the jury: Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507, 290 P. (2d) 229
(1955) (court found circumstantially that the decedent defendant knew he lacked safe
control of his car), and Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 S. (2d} 870 (1946) (court held that
since the plaintiff decedent was unable to prove actual knowledge of danger by defendant
decedent, there should be no recovery).
25 Compare English v. Jacobs, 263 Ala. 376, 82 S. (2d) 542 (1955) (a timid, inexperi•
enced woman driver tried to negotiate a slippery country road after her guest had offered
to drive if she was afraid; recovery granted when plaintiff was hurt when car slipped off the
road), and Menkes v. Vance, 57 N.M. 456, 260 P. (2d) 368 (1953) (young college student
drove extremely fast on unfamiliar country road, lost control of his car when he sought to
avoid a mesquite bush; held, no recovery for injuries to his guest).
24

